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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
     
 No. 11-2724 
 ___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
   
     v.     
        
TYRONE TIDWELL 
also known as 
RICO 
 
    Tyrone Tidwell, 
                                           Appellant 
___________ 
   
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:94-cr-00353-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Stewart Dalzell 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit 34.1(a) 
March 26, 2012 
___________ 
 
Before: FUENTES, SMITH, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: April 18, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case comes on appeal from an order of the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which denied appellant Tyrone Tidwell‟s motion for 
the return of property that had been administratively forfeited.  The issue before the Court 
is whether Tidwell was provided with constitutionally adequate notice of the 
administrative forfeiture proceeding.  We hold that the Government satisfied both 
statutory and constitutional notice requirements.  We will therefore affirm. 
I.  
 
As we write primarily for the parties, we omit much of the lengthy procedural 
history of this case and discuss only those facts necessary to our decision.  
On September 7, 1994, Tyrone Tidwell was charged with conspiracy to distribute 
more than five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; operating a 
continuing criminal enterprise, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848; committing two murders 
in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 848(e)(1)(A); and related offenses.  Ultimately, Tidwell pled guilty to all counts of the 
indictment and was sentenced to life imprisonment.   
In the fall of 1995, while Tidwell was in pretrial detention, the Drug Enforcement 
Agency began proceedings to forfeit $6,341, representing proceeds from the sale of 
Tidwell‟s car.  On September 18, 1995, the Drug Enforcement Agency sent Tidwell two 
separate Notices of Seizure by certified mail.  One notice was sent to Tidwell‟s last 
known home address, and the other was sent to him at the Philadelphia Detention Center, 
where he was then being held in federal custody.  Tidwell never responded to either 
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notice.  Pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 1316.75(a), the Drug Enforcement Agency also 
published notice of the forfeiture in USA Today, a newspaper of general circulation.  
After receiving no response from Tidwell for over two months, the Drug Enforcement 
Agency filed a Declaration of Forfeiture for the property on November 20, 1995.   
Tidwell asserts that he did not receive adequate notice of the forfeiture proceeding 
at the time that it occurred, and thus his due process rights were violated.  On November 
20, 2000, Tidwell filed a motion for return of property under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 41, seeking the return of the $6,341 that was administratively forfeited by the 
Drug Enforcement Agency in 1995.  On June 15, 2011, after many delays, the District 
Court determined that proper notice had been given, and denied Tidwell‟s motion.  
Tidwell filed a timely appeal.  
II.   
 
We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a 
District Court‟s denial of a motion for return of property for abuse of discretion.  United 
States v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 376 (3d Cir. 1999).  “The District Court abuses its 
discretion where its decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant 
conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.”  Danvers Motor Co., Inc. v. 
Ford Motor Co., 543 F.3d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation and citation 
omitted). 
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A.  
 
The Fifth Amendment‟s Due Process Clause “prohibits the United States, as the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States, from depriving 
any person of property without „due process of law.‟”  Dusenbery v. United States, 534 
U.S. 161, 167 (2002).  Due process requires that individuals receive “notice and an 
opportunity to be heard before the Government deprives them of property.”  United 
States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993).  In all cases in which 
proper notice under the Due Process Clause is at issue, the touchstone of our analysis is 
whether the notice was “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise 
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present 
their objections.”  Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 
(1950).   
In the administrative forfeiture context, the Supreme Court of the United States 
has held that when a property owner is incarcerated, due process is satisfied when notice 
of an administrative forfeiture is sent by certified mail to the prison where the claimant is 
incarcerated.  Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 173; see United States v. McGlory, 202 F.3d 664, 
674 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).  We have added that if the Government wishes to rely on 
the mail as a means of satisfying the notice requirement, it bears the burden of 
establishing that the procedures at the prison to which an administrative forfeiture notice 
was sent were “reasonably calculated to deliver the notice to the intended recipient.”  
United States v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d 147, 150 (3d Cir. 2000) (en 
banc).  By regulation, the Government must also publish notice “in a newspaper of 
5 
 
general circulation in the judicial district in which the processing for forfeiture is 
brought.”  21 C.F.R. § 1316.75(a); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1607(a). 
B. 
The means taken by the Government to provide Tidwell with notice comply with 
the Due Process Clause as interpreted by Dusenbery, where the Supreme Court held that 
mailing notice to a prisoner at his place of incarceration is “reasonably calculated, under 
all the circumstances, to apprise [the prisoner] of the pendency of the action.”  
Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 173 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314).  In addition to satisfying 
the requirement that notice be sent to a prisoner at his or her place of incarceration by 
certified mail, the Government has carried its burden of demonstrating that adequate 
procedures existed within the prison that would ensure that notice would be delivered.
1
  
See One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d at 155.   
  Tidwell does not dispute that the Government sent the notices to his last known 
address and to the prison where he was incarcerated, that the prison received the notice 
and had a policy and procedure in place for distribution of mail to inmates, and that the 
Government published notice in USA Today.  Rather, Tidwell argues for the first time on 
appeal that the notice the Government provided was insufficient because the Government 
could have assured that the Notice of Seizure was directly handed to him or sent to his 
attorney, but it failed to do so.  The argument that the Government must provide a 
prisoner with actual notice was squarely rejected by the Supreme Court in Dusenbery.   
                                                 
1
 Specifically, the Government provided the District Court with a copy of the Philadelphia 
prison policy governing the delivery of mail to inmates. 
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Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 171 (“[O]ur cases have never required actual notice.”); see One 
Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d at 155 (holding that “the government need not prove 
actual notice to the prisoner . . . .”).  Furthermore, Tidwell‟s argument that the 
Government should have provided his attorney with notice finds no support in Supreme 
Court or Third Circuit precedent.  Accordingly, Tidwell‟s legal argument is without 
merit, and we agree with the District Court‟s decision that the notice given satisfied due 
process. 
III. 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm.  
 
 
 
